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REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN THE WAKE OF SHELBY COUNTY
Frank Deale*
I.
At the conclusion of America’s deadliest military conflict, the United
States Congress sought to reconstruct a nation torn apart by civil war by
enacting a program of radical social change designed to eliminate the legal
disabilities shouldered by the newly freed African-American male
population. Included in the numerous proposals was a series of
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution: the 13th Amendment would abolish
the institution of slavery; the 14th Amendment would provide equal
protection and due process under law to those with former slave status; and
the 15th Amendment would enable them to protect these rights via a right to
vote, unencumbered by “race” or “color” discrimination. The Congress was
empowered to enforce this provision with appropriate legislation.
Less than 50 years after the enactment of these historic provisions, a
substantial number of African-Americans went to polling stations in the
state of Alabama, the home of Shelby County, seeking to register as voters
for an upcoming election. In flagrant violation of the language in the
Constitution, they were turned away because of their race. Undaunted, over
5,000 of them joined a civil case to enforce the Constitution, which was
heard by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court correctly
understood the gist of the plaintiffs’ complaint, which was that “the great
mass of the white population intends to keep the blacks from voting.”1 Yet,
*
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Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 487 (1903).
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notwithstanding the stark nature of the facts, the Court denied relief,
concluding that:
If the conspiracy and the intent exist, a name on a piece of paper will not
defeat them. Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State
by officers of the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get
from equity would be an empty form. Apart from damages to the
individual, relief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the
people of a state and the State itself, must be given by them or by the
legislative and political department of the Government of the United
2
States.

Decades after Giles was decided, the country witnessed a Second
Reconstruction3—a tremendous upsurge of civil rights activism focused on
the rights to vote and to quality education, housing, and jobs4—which
forced all three branches of government to respond in the face of violent
white racism and resistance. Among the numerous congressional responses
was the enactment of an historic statute designed to carry out the mandate
of the 15th Amendment. The Voting Rights Act of 19655 (“VRA” or “the
Act”) did two things: First, under Section 2, it provided a cause of action to
allow the United States government and private parties to file suit in federal
court challenging denials or abridgements of the right to vote that were
based on race or color.6 Second, recognizing the sheer volume of
abridgments of the right to vote taking place in states where the deepest
remnants of slavery existed, and the cost and strategic difficulties of
bringing such individual actions, the Act included two additional
provisions: Section 4,7 which established a formula for determining where
the most consistent egregious violations were taking place, and Section 5,
which required those jurisdictions captured by Section 4 to get future voting
changes approved beforehand by the United States Government to assure
that they would not deny or abridge the right to vote based on race or

2

Id.
Cf. MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION AND BEYOND IN BLACK AMERICA (2007).
4
See generally DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978); BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, FREE AT LAST TO
VOTE: THE ALABAMA ORIGINS OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2007); Bridge to
Freedom (1987) (Episode 6 of Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years 19541985).
5
42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.
6
Id. § 1973(a).
7
Id. § 1973b(b).
3
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color.8 Congress recognized the onerous nature of the requirements, by
making them subject to continued renewal9 to assure that they were
achieving their goals. Congress also included a provision that allowed
jurisdictions to “bail out” of the coverage and the preclearance requirement,
if coverage was no longer warranted by existing circumstances.10
No one disputes that the 1965 VRA served its purposes well. When
Congress renewed the Act in 2006, it stated that “[s]ignificant progress has
been made in eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority
voters, including increased numbers of registered minority voters, minority
voter turnout, and minority representation in Congress, State legislatures,
and local elected offices.”11 The House Report elaborated upon this success,
stating that “the number of African-Americans who are registered and who
turn out to cast ballots has increased significantly over the last 40 years,
particularly since 1982,” and added that “[i]n some circumstances,
minorities register to vote and cast ballots at levels that surpass those of
white voters.”12 The Report explained that there have been “significant
increases in the number of African-Americans serving in elected offices”
and a 1,000-percent increase since 1965 in the number of African-American
elected officials in the six states originally covered by the VRA.13
II.
Writing for the majority of the Court in Shelby County, Ala. v.
Holder, Justice Roberts, speaking of improvements in African-American
voting power since the passage of the VRA, stated that “there is no doubt
that these improvements are in large part because of the Voting Rights Act
. . . . [which] has proved immensely successful at redressing racial
discrimination and integrating the voting process.”14 Yet in that same
opinion, the Court rendered a devastating blow to this essential pivot to the
Second Reconstructionist program, knocking out the formula for
ascertaining which jurisdictions would be subjected to the preclearance
regime.

8

Id. § 1973c(a).
Congress renewed these provisions in 1970, 1975, 1982 and in 2006. Shelby Cty. v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2620–21 (2013). In its most recent 2006 renewal, the
reauthorizations passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 390 to 33, and the Senate
by a vote of 98–0. Id. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
10
42 U.S.C. §1973b(a) (citing § 2(b)(1), 120 Stat. 577).
11
Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (quoting H.R. Rep. 109–478, at 12 (2006)).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 2626.
9
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Even when considering the stunning success of the scheme enacted in
1965, it was not a surprise to close observers that the Court took this
extraordinary, unnecessary, and unjustified step. One of the earliest indications that a majority of the Court would closely scrutinize the VRA for constitutional defects appeared in the case of City of Boerne v. Flores,15 where
the Court, despite having earlier concluded that congressional exercises of
its powers under the Reconstruction Amendments were “plenary,”16 for the
first time imposed limits on the extent of congressional power, holding that
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment could only be used for remedial, as
opposed to substantive purposes—“congruence and proportionality” was
required between the Act and any harm that Congress was seeking to
remedy.17 South Carolina v. Katzenbach18 held that Congress has “full
remedial power” under the 15th Amendment, and “may use any rational
means to effectuate the Constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting.”19 But the Court in Boerne, although citing to a number of voting
rights cases in discussing the powers of Congress under the Reconstruction
Amendments, did not cite to any of the decisions concerning Section 5 that
were decided after the 1982 congressional extension of the Act.20 In a postBoerne case construing Section 5 in 1999, the Court stated that the
provision raised “substantial federalism concerns,” yet held that any
intrusion on state sovereignty was permitted by the 15th Amendment.21 But
then in the next term the Court applied a restrictive reading to the provision
because, according to the Court, to do otherwise would “exacerbate the
substantial federalism costs that preclearance already exacts . . . perhaps to
the extent of raising concerns about Section 5’s constitutionality.”22 This
language in the Court’s opinions, though of no binding legal effect, sent
subtle signals to lawyers and covered jurisdictions seeking to get the Act
declared unconstitutional.
Senator Edward Kennedy queried Chief Justice John Roberts about the
VRA when Roberts was up for confirmation to the Supreme Court in 2005.
He did so because Roberts served as an attorney in the Office of White
House counsel during the Reagan Administration when the VRA was up for
reauthorization in 1982, and while there, wrote a number of memos and
opinion articles arguing for a weakening of the Act.23 In one of the memos,
15

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
17
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
18
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
19
Id. at 324.
20
See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507.
21
Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 282–85 (1999).
22
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Parish Board, 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000).
23
Adam Serwer, Chief Justice Roberts’ Long War Against the Voting Rights Act,
16
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discussing the reauthorization of Section 2 of the statute, he stated that
voting rights violations “should not be too easy to prove since they provide
a basis for the most intrusive interference imaginable.”24 Statements such as
this led to a fairly intense round of questioning of Roberts by Senator
Kennedy, who ultimately voted against his nomination.25
Roberts was Chief Justice when the Court agreed to hear Northwestern
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder26 (“NAMUDNO”) a
case arising amidst a purely Supreme Court-generated controversy around
the constitutionality of Section 527 and a number of pending challenges in
the lower federal courts. Ironically, the plaintiff in NAMUDNO deserved
considerable sympathy. A small utility district in the covered jurisdiction of
the state of Texas, NAMUDNO was governed by a board of five members,
and required to preclear all election changes under Section 5, even though
there was no history of race discrimination in the district. But it could not
“bail out” out of coverage because it did not register its own voters.28
Roberts’ opinion for the Court left little doubt that he felt the statute was
unconstitutional. The gist of the problem, according to Roberts, was not that
the “remedy” of preclearance was not “congruent and proportional” to the
harm it was seeking to redress. The extensive legislative record prepared by
Congress in 2006 precluded such a ruling,29 and even Justice Roberts was
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 27, 2013, 4:01 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/02/
john-roberts-long-war-against-voting-rights-act.
24
Id.
25
John Perr, John Roberts Completes 30 Year Mission to Kill Voting Rights Act,
DAILY KOS (June 25, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/06/25/
1218903/-John-Roberts-completes-30-year-mission-to-kill-Voting-Rights-Act.
26
557 U.S. 193 (2009).
27
Cf. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 584 (4th ed. 2012).
28
Rather than see the bailout provision as a means of providing flexibility to the
statute, Roberts displayed his antagonism to the entire statutory enterprise by describing it
as a “nullity” because, at the time, only 17 of the more than 12,000 covered jurisdictions
had successfully bailed out of coverage. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 211 (2009).
29
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in dissent, “The House and Senate Judiciary
Committees held 21 hearings, heard from scores of witnesses, received a number of
investigative reports and other written documentation of continuing discrimination in
covered jurisdictions. In all, the legislative record Congress compiled filled more than
15,000 pages. The compilation presents countless ‘examples of flagrant racial
discrimination’ since the last reauthorization; Congress also brought to light systematic
evidence that ‘intentional racial discrimination in voting remains so serious and widespread
in covered jurisdictions that section 5 preclearance is still needed.’” Id. at 2636 (Ginsburg,
J. dissenting) (quoting Shelby Cty. Ala. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
Congress went on to find that “second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority
voters from fully participating in the electoral process” continued to exist, as well as
racially polarized voting in the covered jurisdictions, which increased the political
vulnerability of racial and language minorities in those jurisdictions. Extensive “evidence

6

CUNY LAW REVIEW FOOTNOTE FORUM

[Vol. 17:1

compelled to acknowledge that Congress had “amassed a sizeable
record.”30 Rather, the opinion suggested that the Section 5 pre-clearance
requirement violated a principle of “equal sovereignty,” a novel idea
buttressed by only two citations, neither of which provided any illumination
as to the meaning of such a doctrine or why it posed constitutional issues
for Section 5.31 The opinion referred to Section 5 as an extraordinary
assertion of federal power and cited dicta from a number of cases to support
this view, as if that alone made it unconstitutional; but the Court could not
avoid the telling fact that it had upheld the constitutionality of each one of
the numerous reauthorizations.32 The Court devoted barely a paragraph to
the coverage formula, suggesting that covered and non-covered jurisdictions
were treated in a radically different way, while the Court saw the evidence
of discrimination as suggesting more similarity than difference.33 However,
the Court concluded, 7–1, that rather than decide the issue of
constitutionality, it was better to read the statute in such a way as to allow
bailout by covered districts, even though they didn’t register their own
voters.34
of continued discrimination,” Congress concluded, “clearly showed the continued need for
Federal oversight” in covered jurisdictions. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). The overall record demonstrated to the federal lawmakers that, “without the
continuation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protections, racial and language minority
citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to exercise their right to vote, or will have their
votes diluted, undermining the significant gains made by minorities in the last 40
years.” Id.
30
557 U.S. at 205.
31
The cases relied upon were United States v. Louisiana, 361 U.S. 1 (1960), which
raised the question whether the Submerged Lands Act granted to Texas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, or Alabama the submerged lands in the Gulf of Mexico within three marine
leagues from their coasts. In holding that the Act did not grant Louisiana, Mississippi or
Alabama any rights in submerged lands beyond three geographic miles from their coasts,
The language of the opinion says no more than that states were entitled to “equal
sovereignty upon their admission” to the Union. Id. at 16. Also relied upon was Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845), which dealt with navigable waters in Alabama, standing for
the same principle, and Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (1869), a case decided in 1869, seeking
to determine the proper ownership of bonds. None of these cases is of the slightest
assistance in determining what an “equal sovereignty” principle is, or how such a principle
relates to Congressional power under the 15th Amendment.
32
NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 200.
33
Id. at 204.
34
Id. at 211. The Court was unanimous, with only Justice Thomas dissenting in part
declaring the statute unconstitutional. Some observers have wondered why the liberal
members of the Court joined the Roberts opinion, assisting in casting the shadow that
engulfed the act since that decision. See Rick Hasen, Are the Liberal Justices Savvy or
Suckers?, SLATE
(July
1,
2013,
2:29
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/07/are_the_liberals_on_the_supreme_court_savvy_
or_suckers.html; Linda Greenhouse, The Cost of Compromise, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR

2013]

REFLECTIONS ON VOTING RIGHTS

7

III.
Unlike the plaintiff in NAMUDNO, it is far from clear why Shelby
County even had standing to bring a facial challenge to the VRA, since it
was clear that the statute could be constitutionally applied to
it.35 Where NAMUDNO had no history of discrimination, but was not
allowed to bail out from coverage because of the wording of the statute,
Shelby County was not entitled to bail out because the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) had objected to proposed changes submitted by the
County.36 Rather than resolve those objections in the manner that the statute
provides, the County filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the
statute. As Justice Ginsburg’s dissent argued, “even while subject to the
restraining effect of Section 5, Alabama was found to have ‘deni[ed] or
abridge[d]’ voting rights ‘on account of race or color more frequently than
nearly all other states in the Union,”37 and Shelby County and its
surrounding area were active players in that discrimination.
Shelby County itself was a defendant in a recent successful suit against
it alleging that it maintained a discriminatory at-large electoral
system.38 Shortly after the resolution of that case, a city in Shelby County
requested preclearance of a districting plan that would have eliminated the
city’s sole majority-black district that would have been created pursuant to
the consent decree it had just signed. The DOJ objected to the plan, but the
city defied the DOJ and implemented the change, causing the DOJ to bring
a successful lawsuit against the city to restore the seat.39
In neighboring Jefferson County, the city of Pleasant Grove engaged in
purposeful discrimination by annexing all-white areas, but refusing to annex
an adjacent black neighborhood. A federal court concluded that the city had
shown unambiguous opposition to racial integration, both before and after
the passage of federal civil rights laws, and that its strategic annexations
appeared to be an attempt “to provide for the growth of a monolithic white
voting block for the impermissible purpose of minimizing future black
voting strength.”40 As Justice Ginsburg noted, the type of manifest racial
bias evident in this case was even reflected in the personal views of white
BLOG (July 10, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/the-costof-compromise.
35
See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“Facial challenges . . .
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”).
36
Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2621.
37
Id. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
38
Dillard v. Crenshaw Cnty., 748 F. Supp. 819 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
39
See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2646.
40
Id.
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members of the Alabama legislature who, as part of an FBI investigation,
were overheard referring to African-Americans as “Aborigines” as they
discussed fears of a large African-American voter turnout for a
referendum.41
The prevalence of such stark contemporary racism in a covered Section
5 jurisdiction, literally at the core of what Section 5 was designed to target,
makes it astonishing that it could have standing to raise a facial challenge to
the constitutionally of the statute.42 Yet without any acknowledgement of a
blatantly result-oriented relaxation of the standing rules, Roberts went on to
cut and paste from his exceedingly deficient 2009 opinion.
Like NAMUDNO, the Shelby County decision rests on the mystical doctrine
of “equal sovereignty,” but says very little more to explain what the
doctrine means than what was said in 2009.43 Indeed, as venerable
conservative Judge Richard Posner described it, “[t]his is a principle of
constitutional law of which I had never heard—for the excellent reason that
. . . there is no such principle …. [t]he opinion rests on air.”44
IV.
Thus, along with its infamous election law companions from the 21st
century, Bush v. Gore45 and Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,46 five Republican-appointed Supreme Court Justices have
trounced logic and precedent to produce groundbreaking rulings that have
no conceivable rationale other than to buttress the national political strength
41

Id. at 2647.
The cases are clear. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24–26 (1960) (finding
a federal statute proscribing deprivations of the right to vote based on race constitutional as
applied to the state officials before the Court, even if it could not constitutionally be
applied to other parties); Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 743 (2003)
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (“Where, as here, a state or local government raises a facial challenge
to a federal statute on the ground that it exceeds Congress’ enforcement powers under the
Civil War Amendments, the challenge fails if the opposing party is able to show that the
statute “could constitutionally be applied to some jurisdictions.”).
43
The Court added an additional citation, a 1911 case case, Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S.
559 (1911), which, like the cases previously relied upon, shed no light on the
constitutionality of Section 5, and were sitting dormant in the case books in 1965, as well
as during the time that the Court upheld previous congressional reauthorizations. As has
been argued earlier, the facts on the ground have hardly changed so much as to give these
old cases such new bite.
44
Richard Posner, The Voting Rights Act Ruling Is About The Conservative
Imagination, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/the_supreme_c
ourt_and_the_voting_rights_act_striking_down_the_law_is_all.html.
45
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
46
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
42
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of a right-wing Republican Party increasingly focused on destroying Black
political power and entrenching itself in the political arena.47
Unlike 1982, when a “bipartisan” Congress amended the VRA to overturn a Supreme Court decision demanding a showing of discriminatory
intent before a plaintiff could prevail on a Section 2 voting rights
claim,48 the current Congress is far more polarized, and the Republican
Party has nothing to gain, and all to lose, by “fixing” the problem created by
the Shelby County decision.49 Indeed, taking advantage of the chaos caused
by the decision, the very states that were covered by Section 5 have been
moving rapidly to implement changes that would not have been precleared
by the DOJ had Section 5 survived. In almost all of these instances, the
changes are being pushed by the state Republican Party counterparts to
those in Congress whose cooperation would be necessary to amend the
statute.50 Even if serious bipartisan sentiment existed to take on the issue, it
is not clear what changes, if any, would satisfy the five-Justice majority
in Shelby County under the purported rationale that underlies the decision.
Such difficulty in coming up with another formula is the most likely reason

47

Cf. Thomas B. Edsell, The Decline of Black Power in the South, N.Y. TIMES
OPINIONATOR BLOG (July 10, 2013, 9:34 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/
2013/07/10/the-decline-of-black-power-in-the-south/?nl=opinion&emc=edit_ty_20130711.
48
See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
49
On congressional polarization, see THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, IT’S
EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED
WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012); John Aloysius Farrell, Divided We Stand,
National Journal (May 29, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/
magazine/divided-we-stand-20120223. On the lack of organized opposition to the 1982
Amendments, see ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 113 (1987). Many have noted that the Republican Party
has developed huge gains from majority-minority districts. See, e.g., Ari Berman, How the
GOP Is Resegregating the South, THE NATION, Jan. 20, 2012, available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/165976/how-gop-resegregatingsouth#axzz2YU7SxtsU (noting that “in virtually every state in the South, at the
Congressional and state level, Republicans—to protect and expand their gains in 2010—
have increased the number of minority voters in majority-minority districts represented
overwhelm-ingly by black Democrats while diluting the minority vote in swing or
crossover districts held by white Democrats” and that in North Carolina, had placed “half
the state’s black population of 2.2 million people, who vote overwhelmingly for
Democrats, into a fifth of all legislative and Congressional districts”).
50
See Chris Kromm, The Voting Rights Act and the Future of Southern Politics,
FACING SOUTH (June 27, 2013, 5:53 PM), http://www.southernstudies.org/2013/06/thevoting-rights-act-and-the-future-of-southern-p.html; Ari Berman, Why Are Conservatives
Trying to Destroy the Voting Rights Act?, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 2013, available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/172685/why-are-conservatives-trying-destroy-votingrights-act#ixzz2ZQi8vjEQ.
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why Congress did not attempt to do so in 2006.51 So, movement from
Congress seems quite unlikely at this point.52
A number of ideas have been put forward that would allow the
Executive Branch to take action that does not require the acquiescence of
Congress. One proposal calls for attorneys representing plaintiffs in voting
rights cases that were awaiting Section 5 preclearance to ask the local U.S.
District Court where the case is pending and to retain jurisdiction over the
case under Section 3 of the VRA,53 a rarely used section of the statute
which gives U.S. district judges authority, in cases where there have been
findings of 14th and 15th Amendment violations, to retain jurisdiction over
the case and deny further changes from being implemented if they would
violate the VRA or the Constitution.54 In cases involving jurisdictions with
egregious voting histories, this is a mechanism that will allow federal
judges to perform the work done by the DOJ under Section 5. An obvious
advantage of this strategy is that it requires no additional resources for the
plaintiffs and does not require any congressional action.55
Another proposal would require that the Department of Justice allocate
to each U.S. Attorney’s office in a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 at least
one trained U.S. Attorney who would have the responsibility for overseeing
and responding to proposed changes that would have triggered objections
under Section 5 and to prepare litigation under Section 2 of the statute,
where necessary. Once in litigation, the plaintiff could ask for relief under
Section 3 along with other provisions. Other proposals would extend this

51

Issacharaoff, Karlan & Pildes, supra note 27, at 573.
On July 17th the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the Shelby
County decision in which two Republicans showed up: one, Senator Grassley, left early;
the other, Senator Cruz, argued that Section 2 was sufficient to deal with voter
discrimination. The House held a hearing the next day, and one of the reporters present
afterwards reported that “it looks like some key House Republicans don’t want to be
known for killing the Voting Rights Act, but they’d be happy with it dead.” Ari
Melber, Some Republicans Quietly Cheer End of Voting Rights Act, MSNBC, THE CYCLE
(Jul 18, 2013, 2:40 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/07/18/ republican-hearing-confrontsvoting-rights-act.
53
42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c).
54
The court would not allow the change unless the court found that “such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color, in contravention of the voting guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2)” of the
VRA—language which is identical to Section 5. Id.
55
See Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation
and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992 (2012); see also Travis Crum, An Effects
Test Pocket Trigger, ELECTION LAW BLOG (July 8, 2013, 8:36 AM),
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=52659&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=Feed%3A+electionlawblog %2FuqCP+%28Election+Law%29.
52
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idea throughout the United States, in essence covering every U.S.
Attorney’s office.56 This would of course be much more resource intensive.
A few proposals requiring congressional changes would, for example,
define coverage jurisdictions as those which have violated federal election
laws in recent years, capturing many of the problematic Southern
states;57 create a legislative provision providing a “universal right to
vote;”58 or follow mandatory disclosure of electoral changes under
legislation authorized by a similar type of regulation as that existing under
the Elections Clause of the Constitution.59
V.
It is difficult to be optimistic that the VRA will be fixed by the current
Congress. What will therefore be necessary is an unusually active DOJ
working to counter regressive state legislative plans and an active
population mobilized to utilize the ballot box, among other popular
initiatives. Working together to change the political complexion of the
Republican-leaning state governments may bring about necessary changes
for a better, more accessible political process.
***

56

Professor Lani Guinier initially put forth this idea in a discussion on National Public
Radio. See Talk of the Nation: What Changes After Supreme Court Ruling On Voting
Rights Act (NPR radio broadcast June 25, 2013), available at http://www.npr.org/2013/
06/25/195557564/what-changes-after-supreme-court-ruling-on-voting-rights-act.
57
Professor Lani Guinier initially put forth this idea in a discussion on National Public
Radio. See Talk of the Nation: What Changes After Supreme Court Ruling On Voting
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